Abstract-This paper is concerned with the analysis and design of secure distributed control systems (DCS) in the face of integrity attacks on sensors and controllers by external attackers or insiders. In general a DCS consists of many heterogenous components and agents including sensors, actuators, and controllers. Due to its distributed nature, some agents may start misbehaving to disrupt the system. This paper first reviews necessary and sufficient conditions for deterministic detection of integrity attacks carried out by any number of malicious agents, based on the concept of left invertibility of structural control systems. It then develops a notion equivalent to structural left invertibility in terms of vertex separators of a graph, which allows a designer to efficiently determine if a network is perfectly attackable. This tool is then leveraged to design minimal communication networks for DCSs, which ensure that an adversary cannot generate undetectable attacks. Numerical examples are included to illustrate these results.
significant example is Stuxnet, [8] an attack on a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system in an uranium enrichment process plant in Iran. An additional example is the Maroochy Shire incident where a disgruntled employee performed an attack on a sewage control system [9] .
Recent research efforts have endeavored to characterize and provide tools to defend against attacks on control systems. For instance, Mo et al. in [10] and [11] consider replay attacks on control systems and propose using a watermarked input to detect such attacks. In addition, [12] and [13] consider attacks on the electricity grid. Liu et al. [12] provide conditions under which an adversary can cause errors in state estimation. Moreover, Sandberg et al. [13] propose multiple security indices for sensors which allow a system operator to identify sparse attacks and add resources as needed.
Additionally, [14] and [15] consider attacks on DCS where the agents aimed to perform consensus. Sundaram et al. [15] prove that a given node calculating an arbitrary function can tolerate up to f faulty agents if and only if there exist at least 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths to any non-neighboring node. Additionally, Pasqualetti et al. [14] characterize attack identifiability and detectability graphically and algebraically. Sundaram et al. [16] consider the design of an intrusion detection system for a DCS, which can recover true system outputs and identify malicious nodes. Fawzi et al. [17] consider the problems of robust control and estimation and propose a practical decoder to perform attack detection.
Cam et al. [18] characterize DCS that are perfectly attackable, where an adversary's actions have no effect on the output response, and provide algebraic and topological attackability conditions. Additionally, Pasqualetti et al. [19] use the notion of structural left invertibility to graphically characterize attack detectability. Namely the authors show that if a graphical realization of a control system is not structurally left invertible, the system is perfectly attackable, while, if the graph is structurally left invertible, almost all realizations of the system will not be perfectly attackable.
In this article, we extend the analysis work of [18] and [19] to the design of minimal communication topologies capable of guaranteeing deterministic detection of integrity attacks on DCS. We consider the setting of a DCS where no more than p agents or nodes may be compromised. These agents may corrupt sensor data or modify local control policies with the goal of disrupting system operations in a stealthy manner. We assume a detector knows which control policies each agent is supposed to enforce; we also assume it collects sensor information from a subsets of the agents. With these assumptions we are able to characterize systems which are not perfectly attackable regardless of the attacker's policy, leveraging the concept of left invertibility of structural control systems [18] , [19] .
Our main contribution consists in providing design principles to guarantee that any attack will be revealed by a deterministic detector. To do so we first obtain an equivalent notion of structural left invertibility through the use of vertex separators. The use of vertex separators allows a designer to efficiently determine if a system in perfectly attackable. This notion also allows the operator to pose the task of designing minimal robust communication topologies as an optimization problem. Given a fixed number of observers larger than p, we find the minimum number of communication links that can guarantee perfect detectability. Next, we show how the problem of jointly minimizing the number of sensors and communication links strictly depends upon the cost of sensing and communicating. If sensing is more expensive, we show that the optimal choice is to set the number of sensors to equal the number of malicious nodes p and then minimize over the communication topology. If sensing is cheaper than communicating, we prove that the optimal solution is to deploy a sensor to measure each agent. In the case where only agents, but not observers, can be attacked, we again formulate and solve an optimization problem to design a minimal robust network.
The rest of the paper is formulated as follows. In section II, we provide a description of our control system. In section III, we introduce an attack model, define perfectly attackable systems and revisit structural left invertibility. In section IV, we provide graphical conditions for a system to be perfectly attackable for some feasible attack input using vertex separators. In section V, we formulate an optimization problem to minimize the amount of communication in the system while ensuring that the network is robust to perfect attacks. In section VI, we include a numerical example and in section VII, we conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce our model of a DCS. We assume that there are n agents, x 1 , · · · , x n communicating with each other, and that they are observed by m observers, y 1 , · · · , y m where m ≤ n. For simplicity we let X {x 1 , · · · , x n } and Y {y 1 , · · · , y m }. We model their interactions with a directed graph G = (V, E) where V = X ∪Y is the set of agents and observers. Here E ⊂ V ×V represents communication between agents or observation of an agent by an observer. That is, if (x i , x j ) ∈ E, then x i may communicate with x j . Furthermore, if (x j , y i ) ∈ E, then observer y i can measure x j .
A. Graph Theory Preliminaries
The set of incoming neighbors to a node a, is given as
The in-degree of node a, denoted as d 
Here, the out-degree d In this paper we assume every node has a self loop since the current state of an agent is often in part, a function of the previous state. However, this assumption is not essential for obtaining the ensuing results and can easily be abstracted away.
Suppose A ⊂ V and B ⊂ V. A path from A to B is a sequence of vertices a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a l where a 1 ∈ A, a l ∈ B, and (a j , a j+1 ) ∈ E for 1 ≤ j ≤ l−1. A simple path contains no repeated vertices. Two paths are disjoint if they have no common vertices and two paths are internally disjoint if they have no common vertices except for possibly the starting and ending vertices. In general l paths are disjoint if any pair of paths are disjoint. A set of l disjoint and simple paths from a set A to a set B is called a l-linking from A to B.
B. Control and Sensing
We assume that each agent in X is associated with a scalar state which is dependent on time. The state of a node x i at time k is given by x i (k). We assume that the dynamics for each agent x i in X is given by
w i (k) is the process noise in the system and u i (k) is the input to the agent. Here we assume that u i (k) can be written as
Consequently at each time step, node x i computes an input which is a linear function of its incoming neighbor's states. Remark 1: Although we assume that each input is a linear function of the state, in general we can consider an input of the form
, as long as the anomaly detection center knows u * i (k) for all x i ∈ X and for all k. Additionally the state x i (k) can refer to a physical quantity such as velocity, or can simply be a number associated with the node, for instance a value used for consensus.
As mentioned earlier, a set of observers Y observes a subset of the agents. We assume each observer measures exactly one agent, and no two observers measure the same agent. Thus, we assume all observers are dedicated sensors. If observer y i measures agent x j , then we have
To simplify notation, we define
Then, we have
where A [a i,j ] and the matrix C is defined entrywise as
where 1 is the indicator function. We assume the matrix A is stable and that w(k) is some zero mean IID noise.
C. Anomaly Detector
A centralized detector is used to detect anomalies in the system. The centralized detector receives sensor measurements and uses a linear filter to perform estimation. We assume the centralized detector is aware of each agent's update rule, that is it knows A as well as C. Furthermore, if an agent changes its update rule, it notifies the detector. The centralized detector uses the linear filter
to estimate the state, where (A − KCA) is stable. Herê x(k) is a state estimate of the state x(k). A χ 2 detector is used to detect the presence of abnormalities or an attack. In particular, an alarm is triggered if
where
is the residue, P is the covariance of the residue, and η is the threshold.
III. ATTACK MODEL

A. Graphical Attack Description
In this section we describe the attack model and define the concept of a perfectly attackable system. We assume that at time 0 a subset of nodes in V is compromised. The set of compromised nodes are denoted by F ⊂ V. The set of compromised nodes are unknown to the anomaly detector and can be comprised of both agents and observers. For instance, if an attacker is able to locally corrupt an agent, it likely will also have physical access to the sensor which measures it. However, it is known that |F | ≤ p. In this case, the defender must choose how many compromised nodes it wishes to tolerate. The set of all feasible compromised nodes is given by
We will later also consider a set of attacks F x , where an attack is restricted to agents, i.e. no observers are attacked.
Suppose that
We define the set of attack inputs to be U F {u
As a result, we now add additional attack input nodes to our system digraph to represent compromised sensors or agents. Thus, if an agent or sensor node is compromised it now has an incoming edge from an attack input.
B. Algebraic Attack Description
We let x a (k) denote the state of the compromised system and y a (k) denote the output. If an agent x i is compromised by an input u a l we assume its update rule follows
If an agent x i is not compromised the original update rule follows
If an observer y i measuring x j is compromised by input u a l , then its measurement is given by
Thus, compromised nodes have additive attacks. Finally, to simplify notation, we define B
. Thus, when under attack, the DCS has dynamics given by
Moreover, under attack the estimator has dynamics given bŷ
Now consider the difference between the compromised system and the system operating normally. We define the following variables
The goal of an adversary in a DCS is to affect the state of the distributed system without raising an alarm in the centralized detector. To characterize this, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 2: An attack is perfect if ∆z(k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0 and u a (k) = 0 for some k ≥ 0. A system (A, C) is perfectly attackable if there exists a set of nodes F ∈ F xy which ensure the existence of a perfect attack.
Remark 3: If an attack is perfect, the residues of the system operating normally and the residues under attack are the same. Thus, the centralized detector can not distinguish an attack from normal operation. However, while under attack the adversary is able to bias the state away from normal operation. Note, that in practice ∆z(k) need not be 0 to avoid detection. Cam et al. [18] for instance considers the notion of a nearly perfect attack where an adversary can destabilize a system with bounded effect on the residues. In this paper, however, we restrict our attention to perfect attacks since preventing perfect attacks is a necessary requirement for the security of a DCS.
C. Conditions for Perfect Attackability
We now briefly review both algebraic and graphical conditions which allow for a system to be perfectly attackable. To begin we introduce left invertibility.
Definition 4: We define a system (A, B a F , C, D a F ) to be left invertible if for the following system
with initial condition x(0) = 0, y(k) = 0 for all k implies that u a (k) = 0 for all k. It can be shown that the left invertibility of a system is necessary and sufficient for a system (A, B a F , C, D a F ) with compromised nodes F to avoid perfect attacks. In particular we have the following theorem from [18] .
Theorem 5: The following statements are equivalent. 1) There exists a sequence of inputs u a (k) = 0 such that ∆z(k) = 0 for all k.
2) There exists a sequence of inputs u a (k) = 0 such that
F has normal rank less than p . The last statement gives us means to algebraically verify if a system is left invertible. We now look to graphically characterize when a system is perfectly attackable. To do this we consider structural linear systems [20] . Here we associate the graph G a F with a tuple of structural matrices Thus, if we can ensure that a graphical realization of a system is structurally left invertible, then almost all numerical realizations of that system will be left invertible and as a result, not perfectly attackable. We have the following result that characterizes structural left invertibility from [21] . From this result we see that a necessary condition for a system to be left invertible is that there exist more sensors than attack inputs. As a result, we have 
IV. VERTEX SEPARATORS AND STRUCTURAL LEFT INVERTIBILITY
In the previous section we showed that for almost all realizations of a system (A, B a F , C, D a F ), structural left invertibility for all feasible attack inputs is equivalent to a system not being perfectly attackable. In this section we obtain an equivalent characterization of structural left invertibility using the notion of vertex separators. In particular, we can use vertex separators to characterize systems that are structurally left invertible for all feasible attacks F ∈ F xy . Thus given a graphical realization G defined through ([A], [C] ), we would like to determine if there exists a feasible set of vulnerable nodes. To do this, we begin by defining vertex separators.
Definition 9: Given a graph G * = (V * , E * ), a vertex separator S ⊂ V * \ {a, b} of nonadjacent vertices (a, b) is a set of vertices whose removal deletes all paths from a to b.
We now consider how vertex separators can be used to characterize structural left invertibility for a system with attacks on both nodes and sensors. To begin we define the graph f (G) = (V ∪ o, E ) by adding an additional node o to G with directed edges from Y to o. The following result is obtained. 
Proof: ⇒: Suppose there exists a vertex separator
A necessary condition for there to be a p-linking is the existence of a path P 1 such that P 1 ∩(P 2 ∪P 3 ∪· · ·∪P l ) = ∅. As a result, for there to be a p-linking P 1 ∩S 1 = ∅. However, by definition of a vertex separator, any path in f (G) from x 1 to o must intersect S 1 and thus any path from u 1 to o must also contain an element in S 1 . Consequently, P 1 ∩ S 1 = ∅ and there is no p-linking. Thus, the system is not structurally left invertible for the chosen set of malicious nodes.
⇐: Suppose all vertex separators S i of (x i , o) in f (G) satisfy |S i | ≥ p where x i ∈ X . To begin we observe from Menger's Theorem [22] that the minimum size of a vertex separator between x i and o is equal to the maximum number of internally disjoint paths from x i to o. As a result, for each x i ∈ X there exist at least p internally disjoint paths from x i to o in f (G) which we can assume are simple by removing all cycles. Now suppose WLOG an adversary implements a feasible attack policy with p = p where he attacks l ≥ 0 agents x 1 , · · · , x l and p − l sensors y l+1 , · · · , y p . Let us now define a graph g(G) obtained by adding an additional vertex u to f (G) with directed edges to all the attacked nodes. We wish to show that the minimum size of a vertex separator between u and o is at least p. To do this, suppose there exists a vertex separator S u such that |S u | = k < p. Since |S u | < p, the number of attacked nodes, there must exist a node z ∈ {x 1 , · · · , x l , y l+1 , · · · , y p } such that z / ∈ S u . Suppose z is an observer. Then there exists a path u, z, o in g(G), even when nodes in the vertex separator are removed. If z is an agent, there are at least p internally disjoint paths from z to o. Since |S u | < p, at least one of these paths z, P * , o satisfies P * ∩ S u = ∅. Thus, u, z, P * , o forms a simple path from u to o in g(G), even when the vertices in S u are removed. This contradicts the assumption that |S u | < p. As a result, from Menger's Theorem, there exist at least p internally disjoint and simple paths from u to o in g(G).
If there are p internally disjoint, simple paths from u to o on g(G), there are p disjoint and simple paths from U F to Y on G a F . As a result, there exists a p-linking and the system is structurally left invertible for all possible F ∈ F xy . We now extend these results to an attack restricted to just agents so that D 
Proof: The proof of sufficiency follows an identical argument to that of Theorem 10 with the exception that all vertex separators lie in X . The necessary argument also follows directly from Theorem 10 where we replace references to all nodes in X with references to unobserved nodes x i and replace references to sensor nodes y i ∈ Y with references to observed nodes.
Remark 12: We note that Pasqualetti et. al. [14] arrive at necessary conditions for a system to be structurally left invertible using the connectivity of the graph. However, they only consider connected graphs. Here, through the use of vertex separators we arrived at a both sufficient and necessary condition for structural left invertibility for all feasible attacks. This result furthermore illustrates that the digraph need not be connected in order to ensure the system is robust to perfect attacks.
We note that a minimum vertex separator, a vertex separator with the fewest number of nodes, can be computed within a poly-logarithmic factor of M (n + m + 1), where M (n + m + 1) denotes the number of arithmetic operations for multiplying two matrices in R (n+m+1)×(n+m+1) [23] Note here that n + m + 1 is the number of vertices in f (G). Therefore, by performing a poly-logarithmic factor of M (n + m + 1) operations n times, we can determine if a network is robust to all perfect attacks.
Directly determining if there is a p-linking for all feasible attack scenarios requires the defender to check n+m p configurations, each of which requires complexity on the order of a poly-logarithmic factor of M (n+m+1). Alternatively, using the rank condition from Theorem 5, requires the defender to compute the rank of n+m p matrices in R m×n . As a result, using vertex separators drastically improves the complexity of verifying the robustness of a network to perfect attacks.
In the next section we will show how vertex separators can be used to design optimal networks.
V. MINIMAL DESIGN OF STRUCTURALLY LEFT INVERTIBLE SYSTEMS
In this section, we aim to minimize the number of communication links in a DCS while simultaneously achieving a system robust to perfect attacks from a feasible attack policy. To begin we include the following lemma.
Lemma 13:
is structurally left invertible for all possible attack configurations F xy only if the out-degree of each node
Proof: From Theorem 10, we only need to find a vertex separator S i of (x i , o) in f (G) such that |S i | < p for some x i ∈ X . We choose x i such that d Again consider the graph f (G) obtained by adding an addition node o to G with directed edges from Y to o. We let S i be a minimal vertex separator between x i and o, where a minimum vertex separator is the vertex separator of (x i , o) containing the fewest number of nodes.
For a given number of observers m and attackers p ≤ m, we wish to solve the following problem. Problem 1
C j denotes the jth row of C while C i denotes the ith column. The constraints on C ensure all sensors are dedicated and the constraint on [A] ii reflect all agents have a self loop. Here to reduce the amount of communication, we aim to minimize the number of connections in the system. However, to preserve robustness, we ensure that the system is structurally left invertible for all feasible attacks by placing a lower bound p on |S i |.
Theorem 14: The optimal solution to problem 1 is
Proof: We begin by showing that np + n − m is a lower bound of the optimal solution A * 0 . Without loss of generality, assume that {x 1 , · · · , x m } are observed nodes. We observe that
The ([A], [C] ) so that the network is structurally left invertible for all feasible attack policies F xy and A 0 = np + n − m. A feasible configuration would be to select m arbitrary nodes to observe. WLOG we assume that nodes {x 1 , · · · , x m } are observed so that there exists a directed edge from x j to y j for j ∈ {1, · · · , m}. Next for j ∈ {1, · · · , m}, we have d
Thus, each observed node has p+1 outgoing edges, 1 to its observer, p − 1 edges to other observed nodes, and 1 to itself. Finally, for j ∈ {m+1, · · · , n},
That is, each unobserved node has p neighbors besides itself, all of which are observed nodes. Thus we have
We now prove that the system is structurally left invertible for all feasible attack policies F xy by showing that for each x i ∈ X , all vertex separators S i of (x i , o) in f (G) from Theorem 10 satisfy |S i | ≥ p. First suppose x i is an unobserved node and let S i be a vertex separator such that |S i | < p. Since |S i | is less than p and x i has outgoing edges to p observed nodes, there exists observed node x j with observer y j such that x j , y j / ∈ S i . Thus, even after removing nodes in S i , the path x i , x j , y j , o exists. By contradiction
Now suppose x i is an observed node and let S i be a vertex separator such that |S i | < p. If y i is not in S i , then x i , y i , o forms a path from x i to o which means S i is not a vertex separator. Now assume S i does contain y i . Since |S i \y i | < p−1, and x i has outgoing edges to p−1 observed nodes besides itself, there exists observed node x j = x i with observer y j such that x j , y j / ∈ S i . Thus, even after removing nodes in S i , the path x i , x j , y j , o exists. By contradiction |S i | ≥ p. As a result, the system is structurally left invertible.
Instead of fixing the number of sensors under consideration m, the number of sensors can be a design variable which is chosen concurrently with the network. For instance suppose the cost of a communication link is given by K 1 and the cost of a sensor is given by K 2 . The adjusted optimization problem is given as Problem 2
Note this problem is equivalent to
Thus, if K 2 > K 1 so that sensors are more costly than network links, we simply take the minimum number of sensors, m * = p. If K 1 < K 2 , so that network links are more expensive, we take the maximum number of sensors, m * = n. Suppose that we instead consider the case where an adversary only attacks agents, that is the states X , and does not directly manipulate sensors Y. In this case, we are guaranteed that D a F = 0 and the feasible set of attack policies are described by F x . Since, the adversary has less surfaces in which he can attack, the optimal network is more sparse.
The optimization problem for when the attacker is limited to state attacks is formulated as follows. Problem 3
Theorem 15:
The optimal solution to problem 3 is A * 0 = (n − m)p + n. The proof is similar to the proof given for Theorem 14 and is thus omitted. A minimal realization in such a proof has each unobserved node having exactly p outgoing edges to observed nodes and one self loop. Each observed node would have one outgoing edge to an observer in addition to its self loop. We can again solve problem 2, for the case where D a F = 0. Here, for K 2 > K 1 p, we simply use the minimum number of sensors so m * = p. If on the other hand, K 2 < K 1 p, we instead use the maximum number of sensors so m * = n. Remark 16: Theorems 14 and 15 arrive at the minimum number of edges needed to design a network robust to perfect attacks. The proof of theorem 14 additionally offers such a minimal realization. However, the general structure of an optimal network is currently unknown and must satisfy vertex separator conditions stated in Theorem 10 and Corollary 11. Obtaining such a general structure is left as future work.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: SECURE PLATOONING
In this section, we provide an illustrative example where the main results are used. More precisely, in this section, we use a simple secure platooning example to illustrate a minimal communication network robust to perfect attacks based on Theorem 14.
The topic of secure platooning has been recently investigated by the research community [24] . Here, we consider a communication network of n agents, with topology shown in Figure 1 , which can be viewed as a simple platooning network. In this network, the vehicles are ordered in a line, and each vehicle can communicate with at most p vehicles ahead of it. The control goal is to move vehicles at a constant speed while maintaining a minimum safe distance. , where matrix A is associated with E X ,X , matrix C is associated with E X ,Y , and the number of observer nodes satisfies m ≥ p. We first assume D a F = 0, so the adversary is limited to state attacks. In a platooning network, intuitively, we would expect the vehicles to communicate locally due to the difficulty and cost of distant communication. Ideally we would solve the following optimization problem
We now prove that the optimal solution to (25) satisfies A * 0 = (n − m)p + n. Since (25) enforces additional constraints compared to Problem 3, by Theorem 15 its optimal value satisfies A * 0 ≥ (n − m)p + n. Now, we provide a feasible configuration pair (A f , C f ) so that the system is structurally left invertible for any feasible set of attackable nodes F ∈ F x and A f 0 = (n − m)p + n. Now assume that
Suppose we obtain the digraph h(G) = (X ∪ o, E ) as described in Corollary 11 . We are going to show that for each unobserved node x i ∈ X , i = 1, · · · , n − m, any minimum vertex separators S i of (x i , o) in h(G) satisfies |S i | = p, and one minimum vertex separator is {x i+1 , · · · , x i+p }. Each x i only has outgoing edges to {x i+1 , · · · , x i+p }, hence {x i+1 , · · · , x i+p } is a vertex separator of (x i , o), according to the definition of a vertex separator. To show that {x i+1 , · · · , x i+p } is a minimum vertex separator, by Menger's theorem we can show that there exist p vertex-disjoint paths from x i+1 , · · · , x i+p to o, respectively. Denote d = (n − m + 1) − (i + 1) = αp + β, α, β ∈ N ∪ {0}, β < p, i.e., the distance between x i+1 , the nearest neighbor of x i , and x n−m+1 , the nearest observed node. One collection of such vertexdisjoint paths is k=1,··· ,p {x i+k , x i+k+p , · · · , x i+k+(α−1)p , x i+k+αp , x n−m+k }. As a result, {x i+1 , · · · , x i+p } is a minimum vertex separator. We can conclude that for each unobserved
is structurally left invertible for all feasible attacks, since for each node in {x n−p+1 , · · · , x n }, the out-degree is less than p, which violates Lemma 13. In order to generate a feasible solution, we need to relax the restrictions, and let the agents in {x n−p+1 , · · · , x n } communicate with at least p − 1 other observed agents.
In this case, the optimal solution to (26) satisfies that A * 0 = np + n − m. According to Theorem 14, A * 0 ≥ np + n − m. We now provide a feasible configuration (A f , C f ) that is structurally left invertible for any feasible attack F ∈ F xy . Specifically we let E f X ,X = {(x i , x i+k )|i = 1, · · · , (n − m), k = 1, · · · , p} ∪Ē E f X ,Y = {(x n−m+i , y i )|i = 1, · · · , m}, HereĒ is defined so that we add outgoing edges from each observed agent to p − 1 other observed agents and self loops. In this case, assume that the attacker attacks p * observers, where p * ≤ p, which is equivalent to removing p * observer nodes and p * attack inputs synchronously. The remaining communication network contains m−p * observed nodes and n − m + p * unobserved nodes, and no sensor attacks, which can be represented through a structured system
We now obtain the digraph h(G) = (X ∪o, E ) as described in Corollary 11. We prove that for each unobserved x i ∈ X , all vertex separators |S i | of (x i , o) in G satisfy |S i | ≥ p−p * . For each unobserved node x i ∈ {x 1 , · · · , x n−m }, the size of the minimum vertex separator is p−p * . This is because there exist p paths prior to removing observers and removing p * observers removes at most p * vertex-disjoint paths from x i to o. Now WLOG, assume that attacker attacks observer nodes y 1 , · · · , y p * , then the set of nodes {x n−m+1 · · · , x n−m+p * } becomes unobserved. Note that each unobserved node x i ∈ {x n−m+1 · · · , x n−m+p * } is still connected to at least p − p * observed nodes so the size of the minimum vertex separator |S i | of (x i , o) is p − p * . Hence, according to Corollary 11,
is structurally left invertible for all feasible attack polices F ∈ F xy .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we consider the setting of a DCS where a subset of up to p agents and sensors may be compromised. We place a special focus on perfect attacks where an adversary can bias the system state without introducing a net effect on the output response. Previous work has shown that network topology determines the susceptibility of a DCS to a perfect attack based on the concept of structurally left invertible systems. Our main contributions include introducing the notion of vertex separators which allows us to graphically characterize systems which are resilient to perfect attacks regardless of an adversary's attack policy.
We then use vertex separators to pose the problem of minimizing the number of communication links in our network. For a given number of sensors, we arrive at the minimum number of links which ensure resilience to perfect attacks. Furthermore, we considered the problem of jointly minimizing the network and the number of sensors. We determined that if sensing was more expensive than communicating it is optimal to minimize the number of sensors in a network while if communicating was more expensive than sensing it was optimal to observe the entire network and minimize communication. Future work includes applying these results to real large scale systems. In addition, we would like to consider constraints on network communications with nonuniform link costs when performing DCS design. Finally we wish to investigate a larger class of attacks including the case where an adversary disrupts communication.
